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The synoptic character of the American Constitution has created favorable 
conditions for varied interpretations that were hotbeds of controversy and conflicts. 
The explanation of the U.S. Constitution is a problem of constitutional theory, 
constitutional doctrine, constitutional history, as well as political theory. The pro-
ponents of constitutional interpretation labeled as the living constitution are of 
the opinion that the Constitution should be treated as a legal act with a dynamic 
meaning depending on the time of interpretation. Originalism is perceived as 
the main alternative to the living constitution interpretation. Contemporary 
American scholars emphasize that there is no dichotomy between the proponents of 
living constitutionalism and the supporters of originalism. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Undeniably, the American political system was deeply thought through and 
projected by people who were well oriented in contemporary political conditions. 
The intention of some was to create new structures functioning in a republican 
manner. The American polity should have been based on active and broad partic-
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ipation of citizens, and the construction of the American form of government was 
an intellectual experiment. The debate over whether the authors of the American 
Constitution intended to design a democratic government has been lively up 
to the present time in the American academic discourse.1 The answer appears 
to be complex. Some scholars take the view that the Framers did not intend to 
create a democracy in which the people rule directly.2 The size of the country 
and the distances between its inhabitants would have made that physically 
impossible. The Framers rather worried that a government in which all citizens 
directly participated “would be a government excessively subject to temporary 
popular passions and one in which minority rights would be insecure”.3 It seems 
that their intent was to create a republic because they understood that it was 
a kind of government in which a system of representation was able to operate. 
By designing such a system, the Framers chose the possibility of the members 
of the House of Representatives to be elected directly by the American citizens. 
Finally, popular election to that chamber was approved but not unanimously, 
and the popular rule was not the only element of the new government. It was 
the state legislatures, and not the people, who would choose the senators. It 
was the electors, and not the people, who would choose the president. James Q. 
Wilson and John J. DiIulio, Jr., argue that “without these arrangements, there 
would have been no Constitution at all, for the small states adamantly opposed 
any proposal that would have given undue power to the large ones”.4 Therefore, 
a direct popular election of the president would have made the populous states 
the dominant ones. The Framers “wished to observe the principle of majority 
rule, but they felt that, on the most important questions, two kinds of majorities 
were essential – a majority of voters and a majority of states”.5
1 Burnham, W., Introduction to the Law and Legal Systems, 3rd edn., West Group Publish-
ing, St. Paul, 2002, pp. 3-4. See also the discussion on ratification in Ketcham, R. 
(ed.), The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates. The Clashes 
and Compromises that Gave Birth to our Form of Government. Edited and with an introduc-
tion by Ralph Ketcham, A Signet Classic, New York, 2003, pp. 12-14.
2 E.g., James Q. Wilson and John J. DiIulio, Jr. share this opinion, cf. Wilson, J. Q.; 
DiIulio, J. J., Jr., American Government Institutions and Policies, 11th edn., Houghton 
Mifflin Company, Boston-New York, 2008, p. 27. 
3 Loc. cit.
4 Ibid., p. 28.
5 Loc. cit. It is also interesting to consider that in the beginning of the 20th century 
Charles A. Beard presented his highly discussed opinion that it was the economic 
interest that had played an important part in the development of the Constitution. 
From his point of view the members of the Convention in Philadelphia who drafted 
the Constitution would have taken advantage of the establishment of the new sys-
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 Although the approaches to the process of creation of new political structures 
were diverse, the ideas of the Founding Fathers were verified empirically. The 
Founding Fathers chose a political system and government which were based 
on a written constitution. As customs are always manifestations of their epoch, 
the proposed solutions were reflections of contemporary needs and the polit-
ical situation. The American Constitution structured and formed the federal 
American polity and government, and it also structured American politics.6
Reflection on the interpretation of the American Constitution is impressive, 
and it is the subject of such academic disciplines as legal theory, constitutional-
ism, legal history, as well as political theory. The modest scope of this article does 
not allow for an exhaustive treatment of the subject, therefore, the present work 
is of a contributory character. My focus is on the development of the living consti-
tution theory and the current described as originalism within the American aca-
demic constitutional theory. Therefore, the actions and opinions of the Supreme 
Court will not be taken into account in an exhaustive way.7 In the beginning 
there will be presented some characteristics and the development of the trends 
mentioned above. The second part of the paper will be devoted to the matter 
of changes to the American Constitution via the process of amendments. The 
questions asked in the article concern the American (sometimes controversial) 
academic debate. Regarding the mentioned discourse, the following questions 
can be advanced: Did the Framers intend any fixed method of constitutional 
interpretation? Is there really a dichotomy between living constitutionalism and 
tem. See Beard, Ch. A., An Economic Interpretation of Constitution of the United Sates, 
Macmillan, New York, 1921 (1913), pp. 73-151; for more, see Sokalska, E., Legal 
and Political Dimensions of American Federalism: Development and Interpretations, Wy-
dawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warmińsko-Mazurskiego w Olsztynie, Olsztyn, 2018, p. 
162. Beard’s research concerning the economic interest view was challenged in the 
1950s. See here Brown, R. E., Charles Beard and the Constitution: A Critical Analysis of 
“An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution”, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
1956, pp. 1-219; McDonald, F., We the People, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 
1958, pp. 1-436.
6 Professor Mark Tushnet, unlike some legal scholars who consider the Constitution a 
project for American democracy, sees the Constitution as a framework for political 
debate. Cf. Tushnet, M., Why the Constitution Matters, Yale University Press, New 
Haven, London, 2010, p. 1.
7 The reflection on the American interpretation of the Constitution and legal acts is, 
of course, more extensive than the living constitution and originalism, which are taken 
into consideration in the present article. The issues of textualism, strict construc-
tionism, pragmatic interpretation, or structural interpretation are also addressed 
by many scholars. For further reading, see Mitchell, J. F., Textualism and the Four-
teenth Amendment, Stanford Law Review, vol. 69, no. 5, 2017, p. 1237. 
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originalism from the perspective of American legal and political scholars? Are 
Americans afraid of the amendment method of constitutional changes? Why 
do they mostly choose to develop their Constitution by way of new interpreta-
tions? How to change the Constitution in order to keep pace with the times?
2. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INTERPRETATION 
American citizens often express the notion that the U.S. Constitution is per-
manent and stable. They revere their Constitution but they feel a constant sense 
of uneasiness by growing signs of political dysfunction. Economic situations 
generate fears that the political system may not be able to respond effectively. 
It is significant that the American Constitution has given rise to a remarkable 
range of interpretations over the years.8 A great amount of eminent American 
scholars have dealt with this problem.9 Professor Mark Tushnet, in his book Why 
the Constitution Matters, assumes that the Constitution matters because it protects 
American fundamental rights. He is also of the opinion that the Constitution 
matters because it symbolizes American political culture’s commitment to the 
very idea that Americans have fundamental rights. However, he does not say 
anything about what those fundamental rights are or how they are protected, 
but he does say that protecting fundamental rights is important to American 
citizens.10 In this context, Tushnet also emphasizes the meaning of the inter-
pretation of the Constitution exercised by the Supreme Court, assuring that the 
Constitution protects the fundamental rights through its constitutional inter-
pretation. He also indicates that the president is a crucial player in determining 
what view of fundamental rights the Supreme Court takes.11
8 Ackerman, B., The Living Constitution, Harvard Law Review, vol. 120, no. 7, 2007, pp. 
1743-1744.
9 E.g., the issue of the scholarly debate on the Constitution is raised in Main, J. T. 
(ed.), Is the American Constitution Obsolete?, Carolina Academic Press, Durham, 2013, 
pp. 1-316. A group of distinguished contributors of the book includes: Akhil Reed 
Amar, Mark Tushnet, Paul Finkelman, Mark A. Graber, Larry A. Sabato, Sanford 
Levinson, Richard M. Pious, Stephen Macedo, and others. See also Barber, S. A.; 
Flaming, J., Constitutional Interpretation. The Basic Questions, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2007, pp. 1-201.
10 Tushnet, op. cit. (fn. 6), p. 11. It should be taken into account that the early debate 
on the American Constitution was to some extent devoted to the understanding of 
liberty in the 18th century.
11 Ibid., pp. 2-5.
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3. THE NOTION OF THE LIVING CONSTITUTION
The proponents of constitutional interpretation labeled as the living con-
stitution are of the opinion that the Constitution should be treated as a legal 
act with a dynamic meaning depending on the time of interpretation. There-
fore, it has, to some degree, the properties of an animate being. Every society 
develops its political, social, and economic structures in order to achieve the 
desired level of progress. It is not a simple mechanism, but a living and evolving 
organism. Such an understanding led to the view that the interpretation of 
the Constitution should be parallel with the advancement of the society and 
civilized changes of the world. In other words, it should keep pace with the 
times. It can be noticed that constitutional interpretation described as the 
living constitution is more than a specific method of interpretation – it is a part 
of a constitutional view or doctrine. It is often associated with judicial prag-
matism, and non-originalist theories of interpretation. Pragmatists perceive, 
as a matter of social necessity, the Constitution as evolving over time. The 
interpretation of the Constitution in accordance with its original meaning or 
original intent is unacceptable in the case of the changing standards of the 
contemporary world. The proponents of the living constitution also advance the 
thesis that the Founding Fathers’ intent was to formulate the document in a 
flexible language using broad terms in order to generate dynamic interpreta-
tion achieving the desired level of progress. The development of constitutional 
interpretation is easier to achieve than the improvement of the Constitution 
via acts of amendment.
4. ORIGINALISM AS A METHOD OF INTERPRETATION
In American legal literature originalism is perceived as the main alternative 
to the living constitution interpretation. It is significant that originalism is, in some 
way, associated with legal conservatives. Opponents of the living constitution-
al theory are of the opinion the Constitution should be changed through the 
amendment process. They argue that because living constitutionalists advocate 
interpreting the Constitution in accordance with current views, the act and 
legal norms are more open to judicial manipulation; in particular, they criticize 
judicial activism. The Framers of the Constitution provided for the process of 
amending the provisions, therefore, it was not their intent to change the mean-
ing of their original words. The originalists also believe that in many cases the 
interpretation of the Constitution is directed at a desired policy outcome, which 
means that democracy is threatened. 
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Originalism in the American academic discourse is often associated with 
the research of Robert Bork12, despite the fact that the roots of originalism can 
be traced much earlier.13 He identifies originalism as “a self-conscious theory of 
constitutional interpretation”.14 In his article “Neutral Principles and Some First 
Amendment Problems”, he advances the requirement of neutrality when arguing 
that “the Supreme Court’s constitutional role appears to be justified only if the 
Court applies principles that are neutrally derived, defined and applied”.15 Bork 
discusses the question of when authority is legitimate in the context of the era of 
the Warren Court, and observes that “the Supreme Court regularly insists – that 
its results, and most particularly its controversial results, do not spring from the 
mere will of the Justices in the majority but are supported, indeed compelled, by 
a proper understanding of the Constitution of the United States”.16 Therefore, 
he assumes, “value choices are attributed to the Founding Fathers, not to the 
Court”.17 Bork understands that such a message of the Court is inspired by its 
conviction that citizens demand such an answer. Such an opinion raises the 
following question: should the Constitution be read and understood in accor-
dance with the citizens’ needs? What about the protection of minorities? Is the 
Constitution perceived as binding law and a set of general principles or only a 
judicial philosophy depending on the political and social evaluation?
5. DEVELOPMENT OF ORIGINALISM
Professor Andrew Coan identifies two periods of originalism, namely the era of 
old originalism and the era of new originalism. The period from 1970-1996 is regarded 
12 Bork, R., Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, Indiana Law Journal, 
vol. 47, no. 1, 1971, pp. 1-35. See also Goldford, D. J., The American Constitution and 
the Debate over Originalism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 1-301. 
About the origins of originalism, see Rakove, J. N., Original Meanings: Politics and 
Ideas in the Making the Constitution, Vintage Books, New York, 1997, pp. 339-365. See 
also Alfange, D., Marbury v. Madison and Original Understanding of Judicial Review: In 
Defense of Traditional Wisdom, Supreme Court Review, vol. 9, 1993, pp. 329-446.
13 For more see the Supreme Court decisions presented by Lino A. Graglia in Graglia, 
L. A., Originalism and the Constitution: Does Originalism Always Provide the Answer?, 
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, vol. 34, no. 1, 2010, pp. 73-88.
14 Coan, A., Living Constitutional Theory, Duke Law Journal Online, vol. 66, Jun. 2017, 
p. 101.
15 Bork, op. cit. (fn. 12), p. 35.
16 Ibid., p. 3.
17 Ibid., p. 4.
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as the era of old originalism marked by the work of Robert Bork and the conservative 
representatives of legal thought who accepted his ideas. During its two decades, 
the program of originalists appeared to be reactive.18 In Coan’s opinion “its over-
arching goal was to provide a theoretical and rhetorical justification for rolling 
back the liberal judicial activism of the Warren and early Burger Courts. (…) it 
sought to weaken judicial remedies against racial and gender discrimination”.19
Keith E. Whittington also distinguishes the old and new versions of originalism 
emphasizing their political and intellectual contexts. He is of the opinion that 
in the United States originalism as a method of constitutional interpretation has 
a long history. In fact, it has been advanced from the very first debates over 
constitutional meaning and it was an important component of the American 
constitutional thought. In the late 1960s the critics of the Warren Court often 
referred to original intent to show their disagreement with the rulings of the 
Court.20 Therefore, the old originalism developed only to serve as the grounds for 
criticism of the constitutional doctrine developed by the Supreme Court under 
Warren21 and early Burger. In the opinion of originalists the central problem of 
constitutional theory was “how to prevent judges from acting as legislators and 
substituting their own substantive political preferences and values for those of 
the people and their elected representatives”.22 It was needed some mechanism 
“to redirect judges from essentially subjective consideration of morality to ob-
jective consideration of legal meaning”.23 Originalists advanced the idea that by 
rooting the judges in the firm ground of the text of the Constitution, and by 
restricting the power of judicial review, the constant threat of political influ-
ence on law would be minimized. In the originalists’ view, the living constitution 
was best realized by the Supreme Court, which was unfortunately settled in a 
political process.24 The old originalists also put emphasis on the subjective in-
18 Whittington, K. E., The New Originalism, Georgetown Journal of Law and Public 
Policy, vol. 2, 2004, pp. 599-613.
19 Coan, op. cit. (fn. 14), p. 102.
20 Whittington, op. cit. (fn. 18), p. 599. It should be emphasized that the Warren Court 
is presented in the American literature as the highest point in judicial power that 
has receded ever since.
21 The Supreme Court under Warren disregarded, in some way, some conventional 
reasoning patterns, see here historically significant decisions in the cases concerning 
racial segregation, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (347 U.S. 483 (1954)); 
Bolling v. Sharpe (374 U.S. 497 (1954)); Cooper v. Aaron (358 U.S. 1 (1958)).
22 Whittington, op. cit. (fn. 18), p. 602.
23 Loc. cit.
24 For further reading, see, e.g., Gillman, H., The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism 
and the Rise of the Notion of the “Living Constitution” in the Course of American State-
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tentions of the Founding Fathers; therefore, that fact became the central concern 
of critics of originalism. The defenders of the Warren Court’s legacy presented 
the argument that the original intent of the Founding Fathers is too remote to 
be understood efficiently. The Founders had many conflicting intentions and 
they were white men making rules to govern an agrarian society dependent on 
slave labor; they were pragmatists who expected the subsequent generations to 
adapt the Constitution to the needs of a developing society.25 
It is significant that among legal scholars there were some constitutional histo-
rians engaged in the discussion on originalism. Jack N. Rakove in Original Meanings: 
Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution26 illustrates the complexity of the 
political environment from which the American Constitution emerged, and as a 
historian, in some way, he influenced academic legal theory and constitutional 
thought.27 It is significant that “the historical literature of civic republicanism 
not only provided substantive grist for constitutional theory; it also influences 
the debate over history’s normative significance for constitutional law”.28 On the 
other hand, the debates between American legal theorists and constitutionalists 
were also valuable for historians and political scientists, and they reshaped the 
historical and political understanding of the Constitution. A. Raymond Randolph 
advanced the thesis that originalism in theory is different from originalism in prac-
tice. To interpret the Constitution from a historical perspective (which is what 
originalism advocates) we have to interpret history. “How well you perform the task 
of the historian will determine how accurately you interpret the Constitution”.29 
Building, Studies in American Political Development, vol. 11, no. 2, 1997, pp. 191-
247; Graglia, L. A., Interpreting the Constitution: Posner on Bork, Stanford Law Review, 
vol. 44, no. 5, 1992, p. 1019.
25 Cf. Brest, P., The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, Boston University Law 
Review, vol. 60, 1980, pp. 215-225.
26 Rakove, op. cit. (fn. 12), pp. 1-464.
27 See also the works of Gordon Wood (e.g., Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early 
Republic, 1789-1815, Oxford University Press, New York-Oxford, 2010, pp. 778), 
or Bernard Bailyn (The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, Belknap Press, 
Cambridge, 1967, pp. 335).
28 Coan, op. cit. (fn. 14), p. 106. It is significant that civic republicanism emphasizes 
the interconnection of the freedom of individuals and civic participation with the 
promotion of the common good. The crucial difference between civic republicanism 
and classical liberalism is the liberal definition of freedom. 
29 Randolph, A. R., Originalism and History: ‘The case of Boumediene v. Bush’, Harvard 
Journal of Law & Public Policy, vol. 34, no. 1, 2010, p. 98. The author presents the 
way historical interpretation can support or distort constitutional analysis in the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Boumedine v. Bush decided in 2008.
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By the late 1980s, Ronald Reagan changed the complexion of the Supreme 
Court. In 1986 William Rehnquist, who was perceived as a conservative, start-
ed his tenure as Chief Justice. The policy of New Federalism was promoted by 
some of the Rehnquist Court rulings and the development of the new originalism 
is associated with some of them.30 There are opinions that the new originalism has 
flourished since the early 1990s.31 In the American society there evolved a forceful 
demand for a new approach to the process of making constitutional decisions, 
which would be able to reconcile the proponents of the early versions of original-
ism and to justify greater judicial activism. Therefore, Keith E. Whittington and 
Randy E. Barnett developed the so-called original public meaning, explaining that it 
follows on from the commitment to written constitutionalism, and showing the 
interpretation-construction distinctions.32 Keith E. Whittington is of the opinion 
that “originalism is too committed to the democratically enacted constitutional 
text and too oriented to preserving decisions made in the past. For those who like 
judges to have more flexibility to make decisions about what constitutional rules 
should govern today and in the future, originalism will always seem too confining. 
For them originalism will always seem too “conservative””.33
6. ORIGINALISM VS. LIVING CONSTITUTION?
As far as an academic approach to the subject of the interpretation of the 
American Constitution is concerned, in the 21st century we are witnessing 
30 It is significant that the Rehnquist Court emphasized the value of states in the 
federal arrangement. In a series of cases, the Court resumed the dual federalism 
arguments, and provided clear evidence that the era of judicial restraint was over 
in the matters concerning federalism and the relationships between federal and 
states’ governments. In several cases, including New York v. United States (505 U.S. 
144 (1992)), United States v. Lopez (514 U.S. 549 (1995)), or Seminole Tribe of Florida 
v. Florida (517 U.S. 44 (1996)), the part of the Supreme Court was more active by 
limiting the power of federal government and directing the interpretation of the 
commerce clause in favor of state rights. For further reading, see Sokalska, op. cit. 
(fn. 5), pp. 330-336.
31 Whittington, op. cit. (fn. 18), p. 599. Andrew Coan argues that the era of new 
originalism lasts from 1997 to 2015, cf. Coan, op. cit. (fn. 14), p. 106. In fact, the 
current developed with the Rehnquist Court more or less.
32 Barnett, R. E., An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, Loyola Law Review, vol. 45, no. 4, 
1999, pp. 611-654. See also idem, Interpretation and Construction, Harvard Journal of 
Law & Public Policy, vol. 34, no. 1, 2010, pp. 65-72. 
33 Whittington, K. E., Is Originalism too Conservative?, Harvard Journal of Law & Public 
Policy, vol. 34, no. 1, 2010, p. 41.
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an evolution. Jack M. Balkin, who is perceived as a liberal theorist34, in his 
monograph Living Originalism puts forward the thesis that originalism and living 
constitution are consistent.35 The question if the Constitution is a living docu-
ment that adapts to changing circumstances, or if it should be interpreted in 
accordance with its original meaning should not be asked because the views 
are rather compatible than opposed. The text of the Constitution serves as a 
framework and an essential plan for politics. Subsequent generations must “keep 
the plan going to ensure that it remains adequate to the needs and values”36 of 
the American society. Therefore, constitutional politics must fulfill this duty. 
Balkin emphasizes that the Constitution itself requires faith that the project is 
worth continuing; therefore, constitutional change is a product of “the debate 
and striving over how to continue the plan”.37 Constitutional interpretation is, 
in fact, multidimensional. It involves some historical arguments, ethos, struc-
tural elements, precedent, and consequences.38 A continuous process of living 
constitutionalist construction shows that the original public meaning of the 
Constitution is capacious, and by providing the constitutional framework, judges 
through judicial review, elected officials, or even social movements fulfill the 
contemporary reception of the American Constitution, and, in some respect, 
legitimize constitutional decisions. 
It is significant that some theorists like Reva Siegel, Larry Kramer, or Rob-
ert Post, focusing on historical origins and development of judicial review in 
American constitutional law, argue that with the development of American 
deliberative democracy the citizens themselves are entitled to take control of 
the enforcement of constitutional law and its interpretation.39 Larry Kramer, 
while presenting the popular constitutionalist project, assumes that “the power 
of the Constitution will always be in the people”.40 Barry Friedman confirms 
34 Cf. Coan, op. cit. (fn. 14), p. 113.
35 Balkin, J. M., Living Originalism, Belknap Press, Cambridge, 2011, pp. 1-480. See 
also idem, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, Northwestern University 
Law Review, vol. 103, no. 2, 2009, pp. 549-614.
36 Balkin, Living…, op. cit. (fn. 35), p. 4.
37 Loc. cit.
38 Cf. ibid., pp. 3-4.
39 Kramer, L., The People Themselves. Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, New York, 2004, pp. 1-376. See also the opinion on 
Kramer’s popular constitutionalism in Harding, S., Kramer’s Popular Constitution: A 
Quick Normative Assessment, Chicago-Kent Law Review, vol. 81, no. 3, 2006, pp. 1117-
1126.
40 Kramer, op. cit. (fn. 39), p. 173.
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the importance of popular constitution, and he also recognizes the significance 
of judicial review in keeping with the constitutional standards of the epoch.41 
It should be also noted that Bruce Ackerman, in the monograph presented in 
1993, redefined the civic commitment in the future constitutional perspective 
and underlined the importance of political leadership in the development of 
popular support for constitutional politics.42
Andrew Coan, while presenting the outcome of his research, questions the 
dichotomy between living constitutionalism and originalism. He emphasizes the 
fact that constitutional history evolves over time, and in fact plays a significant 
part in constitutional interpretation and adjudication, and that “the two evo-
lutionary processes are intertwined in complex ways”.43 Constitutional theory 
evolves “through a process of reciprocal action with its environment”.44 Some 
scholars look for transcended principles, and some seek more pragmatic and 
contextual terms. In fact, the evolutionary process of the interpretation of a 
constitutional act is complex. 
Charles L. Barzun assumes that theories of legal interpretation have taken a 
‘positive turn’ in recent years.45 While some representatives of the legal thought 
have argued that the debate on how to interpret the Constitution should be 
resolved taking into account the social facts that determine what the American 
positive law requires, “most of the commentary on the positive turn has focused 
on the substantive claim that what the law requires as a matter of constitutional 
interpretation is a version of originalism”.46 Less attention has been paid to the 
methodological aspects of interpretation. The most important question for the 
positive turn seems to be “whether generating its alleged methodological benefits 
requires choosing among rival positivists theories”47, although, the proponents 
of the positive turn answer quite ambiguously to this question. 
41 Friedman, B., The Will of the People. How Public Opinion Has Influenced the Supreme 
Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution, Farrar Straus & Giroux, New York, 
2009, e.g., pp. 4-5. 
42 Ackerman, B., We the People. Foundations, p. I, The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, London, 1993. See also paragraph 13 Reclaiming 
the Constitution in idem, We the People. Transformations, p. II, The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, London, 1998, pp. 383-422.
43 Coan, op. cit. (fn. 14), p. 99. 
44 Ibid., p. 114. 
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To sum up, it is significant that the American Constitution itself is silent as 
far as constitutional interpretation is concerned. Either there was no consensus 
on how to interpret the Constitution, or the Framers had never intended any 
fixed method of interpretation. Therefore, it cleared the way for a reexamina-
tion of the rules of the Constitution, and for its interpretation in the light of 
the moral, cultural, and political climate of the time of explanation. In the 
American constitutional tradition there can be identified the evolution of a few, 
sometimes contradictory, scholarly trends concerning the interpretation of the 
Constitution. However, in the last two decades we can observe the development 
of academic debate involving legal theorists, historians, specialists in constitu-
tional law, as well as representatives of political science and practitioners who 
focus on a reconciliation of the varied ways of interpretation and enforcement 
of constitutional law.
7. HOW TO IMPROVE THE CONSTITUTION?
One of the crucial problems of the living constitutional theory and original-
ism was how to change the Constitution in order to keep pace with the times. 
The proponents of the living constitution were of the opinion that this should be 
achieved by the means of interpretation, while originalists assumed that the 
Constitution should be changed by amendments due to the development of 
American society.
Immediately after the Constitution was ratified, it started to be the object 
of the debate concerning the ways in which it was supposed to be improved. 
However, in the view of an average citizen, the Constitution was well respected 
and any changes were not desired. Scholars and politicians respecting this broad 
popular support did not suggest many wholesale changes. Professor Lawrence 
Sager in his monograph Justice in Plainclothes. A Theory of American Constitutional 
Practice presents the opinion that what makes a constitution interesting is what 
people do with it. American people take the Constitution seriously. It is gen-
erally believed that the Constitution is a set of traditions and institutions.48 In 
the opinion of Akhil Reed Amar the U.S. Constitution was “not merely a text 
but a deed – a constituting”.49 
48 Sager, L. G., Justice in Plainclothes. A Theory of American Constitutional Practice, Yale 
University Press, New Haven, London, 2004, p. 1.
49 Amar, A. R., America’s Constitution. A Biography, Random House Trade Paperbacks, 
New York, 2005, p. 5.
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The issue of the scope of constitutional amendments was the subject of the 
political and legal discourse almost immediately after the Constitution was 
proclaimed. It is significant that the problem of amendments of the Constitu-
tion has been a multifaceted phenomenon. There are two main approaches to 
the changes of the constitution in the American constitutional doctrine: formal 
amendments and informal amendments. Formal amendments are official chang-
es, while informal amendments are substantive changes.50 The mechanism of 
the formal amendments to the Constitution is complicated, multi-phase, and 
based on a wide political consensus. Therefore, the U.S. Constitution is rather 
placed among non-elastic constitutional acts which are hardly convertible. It is 
significant that thanks to some informal, substantive changes the Constitution 
is able to be up to the challenge of the present time. Informal changes may 
appear under the influence of some consequential political, social, economi-
cal, and other conditions, e.g. the development of new technologies, when the 
society, political elites, or federal or state bodies see the need for changes.51 In 
fact, the substantive changes develop by the means of dialogue and they are 
not codified.52 Thanks to the informal changes the American Constitution may 
adjust to the changeable political and social reality.
8. THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS’ ISSUE
The 1980s were the decade when there were many suggestions concerning 
the improvement of the Constitution. A lot of suggested changes concerned the 
50 Cf. Strauss, D., The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, Harvard Law Review, 
vol. 114, 2001, pp. 1457-1505. For more, see the article of Richard Albert and cited 
there American literature, Albert, R., The Structure of Constitutional Amendment Rules, 
Wake Forest Law Review, vol. 49, 2014, pp. 913-975. The subject of amendments to 
the U.S. Constitution is vivid in Polish academic research, see, e.g., Lis-Staranowicz, 
D., Zmiana Konstytucji Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki (wybrane zagadnienia), Państwo i 
Prawo, vol. 12, 2018, pp. 73-87.
51 See the arguments for and against a non-elastic constitution in Jackson, V. C., 
The myth of (un)amendability of the US Constitution and the democratic component of 
constitutionalism, International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 3, 2015, pp. 575-
605. In the mentioned article Professor Vicki C. Jackson explores some claims 
about the amendment process of the U.S. Constitution. 
52 See the examples of the informal, substantive changes of the U.S. Constitution 
in Lis-Staranowicz, D., Legitymizacja sądowej kontroli prawa w Stanach Zjednoczonych 
Ameryki, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warmińsko-Mazurskiego w Olsztynie, 
Olsztyn, 2012, p. 72.
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reorganization of the American federal system in opposite directions: either 
by strengthening federal governance, or by weakening it. The proponents of a 
strong government assume that one of the main difficulties with the Constitu-
tion is the separation of powers, and “by making every decision the uncertain 
outcome of the pulling and hauling between the president and the Congress, 
the Constitution precludes the emergence – except perhaps in times of crisis – 
of the kind of effective national leadership the country needs”.53 In this view, 
the American federal country faces a number of challenges that need decisive 
and fast actions which should be able to be formulated by the president and 
undertaken without any pressures from interest groups tied only to local or 
state interests. The critics of the separation of powers assume that the govern-
ment agencies responsible for implementing federal programs are exposed to 
interference from legislators, so the president is in charge of the bureaucracy, 
but in reality, he must share his powers with the members of Congress and its 
committees. In other words, there is a fear that the separation of powers makes 
the president’s powers too weak.
The proposals of a reduction of the separation of powers in the view of some 
authors include the following: to “allow the president to appoint members of 
Congress to serve in the cabinet (the Constitution forbids members of the Con-
gress from holding any federal appointive office while in Congress); allow the 
president to dissolve Congress and call for a special election (election can now 
only be held on the schedule determined by the calendar); allow the Congress 
to require a president who has lost its confidence to face the country in a special 
election before his term would normally end”.54 There are also some proposals 
to require the presidential and congressional candidates to run as a team in 
congressional districts, therefore a presidential candidate of a given district could 
be sure that “the congressional candidate of his party would also win in the 
district; have the president serve a single six-year term instead of being eligible 
for up to two four-year terms, this would presumably free the president to lead 
without having to worry about reelection; lengthen the terms of members of 
the House of Representatives from two to four years so that the entire House 
would stand for reelection at the same time as the president”.55
In the 21st century there have been no amendments to the American Con-
stitution despite the fact that amendment projects have been submitted more 
than once to the Congress. Professor Dorota Lis-Staranowicz argues that the 
53 Wilson; DiIulio, op. cit. (fn. 3), p. 40.
54 Loc. cit.
55 Loc. cit.
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proposed changes would restrict the federal powers.56 However, some critics of 
the Constitution are in favor of a weaker federal government. They are of the 
opinion that sometimes the separation of powers may moderate the growth of 
federal government but sometimes the idea of democracy can produce unintended 
results by meeting demands of some interest claims rather than taking into account 
long-term values. Critics suggest various mechanisms, especially constitutional 
amendments that, for example, would reduce the amount of money collected in 
taxes by the federal government. There are also some proposals to curtail judicial 
power, but the opponents argue that if the Congress and the people do not approve 
of the way the Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution, they can always 
amend this act to adopt some limitations on court powers.
9. CONCLUSION
The modern separation of powers mechanism which was implemented for 
the first time in practice in American constitutionalism tended to prevent the 
tyranny of the majority as represented by the people in the legislative body. The 
constitutional rule of law was incorporated into American constitutionalism in 
the form of judicial review of governmental acts by independent courts. A system 
of government was established with sufficient powers to realize the aims of the 
society taking into account the idea of individual rights, where the separation 
of powers mechanism was the attempt to support this challenge.
Undeniably, the synoptic character of the American Constitution created 
favorable conditions for varied interpretations that were hotbeds of controversy 
and conflicts. The American debate was not only on the interpretation of the 
Constitution, it also concerned the significance of judicial review. For some, 
judicial activism was treated as synonymous with living constitutionalism. The 
term was generally used to accuse judges of resolving cases based on their own 
political preferences and subjectivity.57
56 Lis-Staranowicz, op. cit. (fn. 50), p. 81. As Professors Jan Galster and Dorota 
Lis-Staranowicz argue, the debate concerning the scope of the amendments to the 
U.S. Constitution is revived from time to time. The case of the burning flag (Flag 
Burning Act of 1989) can serve as an example. For further reading, see Galster, J.; 
Lis-Staranowicz, D., Doktryna zastępowalności konstytucji. Ratione materiae wobec ratio-
ne temporis, Państwo i Prawo, vol. 10, 2016, pp. 27-28. See also the characteristics of 
the constitutional replacement doctrine developed in comparative law studies on consti-
tutionalism, ibid, pp. 24-26. 
57 The political character of the U.S. Supreme Court is noticed in Polish scientific liter-
ature (e.g., Małajny, R. M., Rola Sądu Najwyższego w procesie wykładni Konstytucji USA, 
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Contemporary American scholars emphasize that dichotomy between the 
proponents of living constitutionalism and their adversaries – the supporters 
of originalism, is only apparent. From the perspective of the existence of the 
American federal state, 27 amendments to the American Constitution is a 
small number. Some of them, proposed and ratified in the 18th century in fact 
complemented the Constitution. It is obvious that Americans do not choose 
constitutional changes by means of amendments in a formal way. They prefer 
the development of the Constitution through new ways of interpretation and 
some informal – substantive changes. The informal changes to the American 
Constitution cause the American constitutional act to be still in touch with 
the changeable political reality. The question of how to read the Constitution 
is not answered exhaustively. I assume that judicial review is approved and 
confirmed in American legal culture, therefore the participants of the debate 
over the interpretation of the Constitution should take it into account while 
they question the objectivity of judges. Due to the fact that the Framers did not 
leave any obligatory method of interpretation, the text might be reexamined 
in the most efficient way. I am of the opinion that in the background of the 
American debate between the proponents of the living constitution theory and 
originalists (in its old and new versions) there have always been politics and 
political forces rather than any intellectual trends or philosophical grounds as 
some American legal and political scholars have emphasized in their research. 
We may ponder over the extent to which the American discussions have 
influenced European constitutional-legal debates. In Europe – especially Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe – the debates regarding historical interpretation and 
the interpretation of contemporary constitutions have been carried out. In 
post-Communist states they are often connected with the fact that the consti-
tutional provisions were adopted at the beginning of transformation, and some 
part of the legal order consisted of regulations deriving even from real social-
ism. Therefore, constitutional courts in the 1990s widely applied the so-called 
Gdańskie Studia Prawnicze, vol. 31, 2014, pp. 322-325), however, in the reception 
of Professor Łukasz Machaj, the American Supreme Court should not be identified 
with the primitive partyism, or only with the tool in the hands of a political party. 
Machaj quotes American scholars who share the same opinion (Lawerence Baum, 
David M. O’Brien, or William Lasser). Cf. Machaj, Ł., Pozycja ustrojowa Sądu Najwyz∙sze-
go Stanów Zjednoczonych, in Jabłoński, M. (ed.), Identyfikacja granic wolności i praw jednostki 
– prawnoporównawcza analiza tożsamego przypadku pod kątem praktyki stosowania prawa ame-
rykańskiego i polskiego, seria e-Monografie, E-Wydawnictwo, Prawnicza i Ekonomiczna 
Biblioteka Cyfrowa, Wydział Prawa, Administracji i Ekonomii Uniwersytetu Wro-
cławskiego, Wrocław, 2016, pp. 36-37. See also here Bork, R., The Tempting of America: 
The Political Seduction of the Law, Free Press, New York, 1990, p. 16.
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dynamic understanding (taking into account contemporary expectations). In fact, 
the American concepts of originalism and living constitution influence the look at 
central-European (especially Polish) dispute regarding constitutional courts’ 
activism from a broader perspective.58
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Sažetak
Doc. dr. sc. Edyta Sokalska *
INTERPRETACIJE “ŽIVOG USTAVA” U AMERIČKOM PRAVNOM 
I POLITIČKOM DISKURSU. ODABRANA PITANJA
U američkoj znanstvenoj literaturi do današnjih se dana vodi živa rasprava o tome 
jesu li autori američkog Ustava svjesno namjeravali kreirati oblik demokratske vlasti ili 
nisu. Odgovor se, naime, čini vrlo kompleksnim. Iako su pristupi stvaranju novih političkih 
struktura bili različiti, ideje utemeljitelja Ustava potvrđene su u praksi. Oni su pritom 
izabrali politički sustav i sustav vlasti temeljen na pisanom ustavu. Rješenja sadržana u 
njemu odraz su onodobnih potreba i političke situacije, a njime su određeni daljnji razvoj 
i struktura američke federalne zajednice i vlasti kao i američke politike.
Tumačenje Ustava SAD-a problem je kojim se bave ustavna teorija, ustavna doktri-
na, ustavna povijest i politička teorija. Zagovornici metode ustavnog tumačenja nazvane 
“živi ustav” (living constitution) smatraju da Ustav treba shvatiti kao pravni akt s 
dinamičkim značenjem koje ovisi o vremenu njegova tumačenja. Glavna alternativa toj 
metodi je “originalizam” (originalism), prema kojem bi se Ustav smjelo mijenjati samo 
amandmanima. Prema zastupnicima te metode, teorija “živog ustava”, prema kojoj Ustav 
treba tumačiti u skladu s potrebama vremena i trenutačnim stavovima, sam Ustav i njegove 
odredbe čini više podložnima sudskim manipulacijama. Oni posebno kritiziraju sudski 
aktivizam te smatraju da ne bismo trebali uzimati da pravo govori ono što bismo mi htjeli 
da kaže. Važno je pritom uočiti da suvremeni američki znanstvenici smatraju da ipak ne 
postoji tako značajna dihotomija između stavova zagovornika dviju metoda.
Problem sadržaja i dosega ustavnih amandmana predmet je političkih i pravnih rasprava 
praktički od trenutka kada je Ustav proglašen. Riječ je o višerazinskom pitanju o kojem 
se raspravlja u radu, no bitno je istaknuti da se danas ipak preferiraju izmjene Ustava 
novim oblicima tumačenja i drugim neformalnim načinima. 
Ključne riječi: amandman, ustav, interpretacija, pravo, originalizam
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